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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to explore briefly the role that a more phenomenological 
conception of dialectical development of consciousness plays in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer's work on hermeneutics. This is done with both an implicit understanding of 
the dialectical development of consciousness and self-consciousness in Gadamer and 
some explicit references to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit  and his Science of 
Logic in connection with Gadamer's work. However, the twentieth century departures 
from Hegelian logic by the phenomenological and existential philosophers are given 
crucial importance for the work of Gadamer which builds on both Heidegger's essays 
on art in particular and the much earlier Husserlian explorations of consciousness and 
intentionality. Special emphasis is given to  Gadamer's concept of Spiel(play)*  
along with his ideas of Erfahrung( "lived experience" as opposed to Erlebnis or 
abstract experience),Geschehen (event) and Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein 
( Effectively historicized consciousness). 
 
Keywords: Hermeneutics, Method, Truth, Dialectics, Dialogue, Play, History, 
Effectively Historicized Consciousness, Event, Lived Experience, Phenomenology. 
 
* Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from German and Greek in  Gadamer 
in the text are mine as are all the errors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Towards the end of Truth and Method, Gadamer characterizes Hegel as being in 
dialogue with the Greek dialectical tradition and insists upon going back to Hegel in 
order to recover the dialogical element of the Greek dialectics for ourselves if we are 
to understand the purpose of hermeneutics correctly . As is well known now through 
recent essays by Pippin and Taylor among others and Gadamer's own work on Hegel, 
Gadamer himself followed his own advice.1 But it can be argued that he departs from 
Hegel in ways that are significant for his development of a phenomenological and 
dialectical hermeneutics. The purpose of this paper is to is  to illustrate in a plausible 
manner how Gadamer's own philosophical strategy both follows from Hegel, Husserl 
and Heidegger and overcomes them in order to move beyond the limits of traditional 
hermeneutics. In other words, I argue that the key problem that Gadamer sets for 
himself is the interpretation/understanding of the world including---and perhaps 
especially---the social world. The solution of this problem of understanding 
(Verstehen) requires at the same time using the dialectical categories of Hegel but also 
of overcoming these categories by following and developing dialectically the 
philosophical strategies of understanding the role of situated consciousness as 
articulated by Husserl and Heidegger.2 
 
In the first part of this essay, I clarify certain ideas in Hegel---of dialectics in 
particular--- as exemplified by his discussions in his classic Phenomenology of Spirit 
(PS) and Science of Logic (SL). This is done in light of Gadamer's idea of the classics 
as those works that always play a mediating role in the contemporary conversations . 
                                                       
1
 See in particular, Gadamer(1985-1995,1967-1979,1976a,b; 1980,1981,1985,1986a,b;1989,1997), Code(2003), 
Dostal(2002), Grondin(2003), Malpas et. al.(2002), Wright(1990). 
2
 It should be mentioned that I have no intention of defending Gadamer's silences and opportunistic moves during 
the 1930s and 40s as some have tried to do. I share Richard Wolin's(2000,2004) criticisms of Gadamer's 
opportunism without subscribing to the view that his or Heidegger's philosophies somehow cohere with a Nazi 
worldview.  However, I agree with the view expressed in an essay appearing in the recent collection Feminist 
Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer, by Robin May Schott that questions just how open-ended and inclusive 
Gadamer's notion of "conversation" really is. "When one's conversational partners are drawn from an exclusive 
club of like-minded men," she writes, "it is easier to display the hermeneutic generosity of spirit that assumes the 
openness to one's opponents' positions and the probability that they are right." 
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The purpose of this part is to explore briefly the role that a dialectical development of 
logical understanding and consciousness plays in Hegel.3 The emphasis will be on PS, 
with only some remarks on SL when relevant.4It is clear from extensive references 
throughout Truth and Method (but especially parts two and three---see in particular 
the references in notes 57 and 59 to PS in part 2) that Gadamer takes Hegelian 
dialectics seriously and is himself in dialogue with Hegel.  
 
I then focus on Gadamer's use of certain Husserlian and Heideggerian constructions 
and a way of sublating these which is specific to Gadamer's own particular 
philosophical strategy. At the end I raise the question of how much damage a 
phenomenological interpretation of the Gadamerian hermeneutics does to the 
conception of scientific method and what Gadamer's approach can contribute to our 
further understanding of the human sciences.The line of thinking  that Gadamer 
develops in Truth and Method has serious consequences for the human sciences.To 
some, the implications for phenomenological social science research are clear enough. 
For these writers, if Gadamer is right, then real understanding is impossible through 
the ordinary methods of positivist---or even realist---philosophy of science. However, 
a deeper understanding of Gadamer can allow us to see the phenomenological 
hermeneutics and scientific realism as complementary modes of inquiry. One must 
then engage in a lively dialogical play in order to let "truth" emerge in a way that I 
will call Gadamer's dialectics of play ( Spiel) in contradistinction with the Hegelian 
dialectics. With these preliminary remarks I now turn to a brief discussion of Hegelian 
dialectics to prepare the way towards Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
 
 
                                                       
3
 There are, of course, many interpretations and exegetical pieces on PS. Jean Wahl's discussion of the unhappy 
consciousness and its subsequent influence on French thinking is a prominent case in point. There are also works 
by Hyppolite, Westphal, Kojeve, Pippin and others each with its distinctive viewpoint. Mine is, in a sense, closest 
to that of Westphal but without his theism. In terms of dialectical logic, I have been influenced by Ilyenkov's book 
by the same title. 
4
 Hegel's earlier work The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy  is also of some 
importance. But a historical exegesis of the evolution of Hegel's thought in this manner would take us too far 
afield. 
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2. Hegel's Dialectics contra Kant and Gadamer's Critique of Kant 
 
It is important to see both Gadamer and Hegel  in a post-Kantian philosophical 
context.. In this particular context, among other things, Hegel was wrestling with 
Kant's particular solution to Humean skepticism which challenged the ideas of 
causality, necessity and universality, ultimately  negating the possibilities of deriving 
certain knowledge of the world through rational reflection. Hegel found Kant's 
solution through a critique of pure reason to be a partial one only. In his view, Kant 
conceded too much to Hume by restricting the possibility of knowledge only to the 
realm of phenomena and thus making it seemingly impossible to gain knowledge of 
the ultimate reality. For his part,  Gadamer starts off by criticizing Kantian aesthetics 
as overly abstract and unable to capture the real experience of beauty--- a theme to 
which he returns in several places.5 In his writings on Hegel, Gadamer makes clear 
that he is  much more sympathetic to the liveliness of Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit (PS) than to Kant's transcendental categories.6 In Truth and Method, Gadamer 
engages in a dialogue with Hegel in this post-Kantian spirit. 
 
 PS can be seen as Hegel's early and preliminary investigation of the development of 
a reflective consciousness through using a kind of dialectical logic. More specifically, 
Hegel attempts to establish clearly the stages that an ordinary consciousness needs to 
go through in order to reach the necessary epistemological and  ontological 
conditions for embarking on further speculative thought that rejects Kant's 
epistemological and ontological  claims regarding the inability of pure reason to 
know the thing-in-itself. In this sense, his later SL pursues the logical and ontological 
                                                       
5
 See also Heidegger, Martin. "Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes." Translated as "The Origin of the 
Work of Art," by Albert Hofstadter, in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 
and in Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 1993). 
 
6
 It is interesting to note that the  Bangalee  poet Rabindranath Tagore had a similar reaction to Kantian 
aesthetics. He describes in a beautiful lyrical poem in one of his earlier books(Chitra) how he was able to simply 
experience the moonlit night when he turned away from the Kantian aesthetic abstractions. 
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structure of speculative thought in depth by starting where PS leaves off. SL starts 
with the idea of pure, indeterminate, immediate “being" whereas PS ends--- after 
consciousness has become fully critical and aware of itself--- with the dissolution of 
subject/object dichotomy in thought. Only then can consciousness finally embark 
upon discovering speculative or absolute knowledge as such. Gadamer will later 
dispute the possibility of completeness or transparency of such absolute knowledge. 
 In SL, Hegel wants to begin without any presuppositions by suspending all 
assumptions about thought and being. His philosophical strategy here is to let the 
indeterminate thought of being unfold through a dialectical movement of 
self-generated contradictions that are sublated through the use of a more developed 
form of dialectical logic. PS is a preliminary necessity only for those who are not 
convinced that this is possible or desirable.  
 The ordinary, non-philosophical consciousness is not moved by the spirit of 
self-criticism. It is this possibility---and indeed the necessity as well--- of 
self-criticism of thought by itself that Hegel wishes to bring out. But the ordinary 
consciousness is fixated upon everyday experiences of objects, processes and 
practices. It does not see the point of challenging these already settled habits of the 
ordinary mind. 
 Hegel wants to help the ordinary consciousness by offering a ladder to the 
inquiring mind in order to finally arrive at the standpoint of speculative logic. Hegel 
believes that the “individual” has the right to demand such a ladder since the ordinary 
mode of consciousness is certain only of its ordinary modes of grasping sense data, 
perception, understanding etc. 
 Hegel shows that starting with immediate sense – certainty, a dialectical 
movement of thought can be traced through the work of many mediations which lead 
ultimately to a perceptual stage of cognition. A similar dialectical exercise with 
perceptions leads to the category of understanding. A further process of mediation and 
sublation     takes the consciousness to the next stage of self-consciousness 
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illustrated through the famous master-slave figure7. In what follows, I will emphasize 
the complexities of this figure. In particular, the role of the laboring process in 
creating self-consciousness will be a central aspect. It may be helpful to elaborate a 
bit upon these preliminary stages of passing  from the  ordinary consciousness to 
self-consciousness. 
 Sence-certainty experiences itself (i.e. in its Erfahrung) as being aware of the 
pure empirical particularity of things. At this point, the consciousness is naïve and 
experiences seemingly no mediation  through concepts or language. It looks at what 
it has before itself simply as “this”, “here”, “now”. However, through its own 
experience (Erfahrung), it realizes that the object (Gegenstand) is much more 
complex than the initial appearances. For example, "this" turns out to be not just a 
pure and simple “this”. A  complex unity and continuity of many moments are found 
to be involved when we try to think through the idea of a simple 'this'.In particular, the 
idea of 'this' also involves the idea of its dialectical negation 'not-this'. Likewise Hegel 
speaks of “now“ as a now which is an absolute plurality of nows and a 'here' that turns 
out to be a complex of many 'heres' involving also "… a Before and Behind, an Above 
and Below, a Right and Left" as Hegel reminds us using remarkably simple everyday 
German locutions. Ultimately, this dialectical movement of what is now a reflective 
consciousness at its early stages takes it to the category of perception which overlays 
sense-certainty. 
 Similar dialectical critical reflection8 on the part of the perceiving consciousness 
                                                       
7
 There is a large literature on this already. From a literary perspective, the rhetorical figure can be seen as an 
elaborate conceit that draws out and emphasizes certain aspects of this figure in order to elucidate how 
self-consciousness develops. The complexities of this process will be highlighted here. 
8
 Here the idea of sublation(aufhebung) is important. Contrary to the popular bowdlerized version of dialectics as 
the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad, Hegelian dialectics is the self-movement of thought where both negation and 
preservation take place continually. In SL( § 184-187), Hegel gives a very clear exposition of this: 
To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most 
important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs 
throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially 
distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is 
immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a 
result which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinate from which it 
originates. 
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results in a further discovery. Perception finds that its object is not just a thing with 
particular proportions and apparent color etc. Rather, it is a concrete expression of a 
force within the object. This is clearly a post-Newtonian and a post-Kantian 
development. Here Hegel is trying to push the Newtonian idea of a mechanistic force 
further and to find its limits.To grasp the nature of this force with the mind requires 
                                                                                                                                                              
Furthermore, Hegel adds: 
'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to 
maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a 
negative element, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in order to preserve it. 
Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that 
account annihilated. 
The two definitions of 'to sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings 
of this word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the same 
word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language words 
which have in themselves a speculative meaning; the German language has a number of such. The 
double meaning of the Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: 
tollendum est Octavium) does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only a 
lifting-up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this 
more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. In the 
case of the lever, weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account of 
the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something real, such as a 
weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial determination, a line.' We shall often have 
occasion to notice that the technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected 
determinations, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it has, as here, 
because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate, whereas the foreign language 
suggests more what is reflected. 
The more precise meaning and expression which being and nothing receive, now that they are 
moments, is to be ascertained from the consideration of determinate being as the unity in which 
they are preserved. Being is being, and nothing is nothing, only in their contradistinction from each 
other; but in their truth, in their unity, they have vanished as these determinations and are now 
something else. Being and nothing are the same; but just because they are the same they are no 
longer being and nothing, but now have a different significance. In becoming they were 
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; in determinate being, a differently determined unity, they are 
again differently determined moments. This unity now remains their base from which they do not 
again emerge in the abstract significance of being and nothing. 
 
 
 9 
(Kantian) understanding (Verstand). The lawful nature of the realm of inner force is 
described further by the Kantian categories of universality, necessity, causality etc. 
Thus it is through this dialectical motion of understanding the inner force that 
consciousness finally finds a dimension of itself in the things outside. It has now 
begun to turn into self-consciousness; but it is still at an early stage of development. 
 A crucial further step in the development of self-consciousness occurs when 
consciousness discovers other living, self-conscious beings. These beings validate our 
own awareness of ourselves by recognizing us. We, in our turn, must recognize them 
as well and thus validate their awareness of themselves . 
 Most importantly, at this stage through this mutual recognition, 
self-consciousness realizes that individual identity is not really that of an atomistic, 
isolated person. Individuals are formed by their interactions with others. These social 
interactions give self-consciousness a social character.9 Therefore self-consciousness 
can think of itself as one aspect of a “unit of…different independent 
self-consciousnesses which, in their oppositions, enjoy perfect freedom and 
independence.” This is the point where a reflective self can say: 
 “I that is We and We that is I."  
There is some danger of misconstruing Hegel as a collectivist. It needs to be 
emphasized, therefore, that Hegel is endorsing a genuine individual 
self-consciousness, but it is a self-consciousness that is rooted in a reciprocal sociality 
at the same time. In §177 of PS, Hegel clarifies further: 
Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the 
unity of itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not "object”. 
The object of desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal, ineradicable substance, 
the fluent self-identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just 
as much ego as object.  
                                                       
9
 Gadamer criticizes the idea of an atomistic individual also. Like Wittgenstein, he rejects the idea of a private 
language. See in particular the sections on language in part 3 of Truth and Method. 
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With this we already have before us the notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to 
become aware of, is the experience of what mind is — this absolute substance, which is the unity of 
the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and 
independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is “we”, a 
plurality of Egos, and “we” that is a single Ego. Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness — 
the notion of mind — its turning-point, where it leaves the parti-coloured show of the sensuous 
immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous, and steps 
into the spiritual daylight of the present. (My Italics) 
 
The socio-historical unity of ‘We and I’ is what Hegel calls Geist or spirit, 
Ontologically, Hegel understands Geist to be the ‘absolute substance’ of individuals 
who belong to Geist”. 
 This brings us to a concrete elucidation of the mutual recognition problem 
through a consideration of the relation between the “master” and “slave” (lordship and    
bondage in J. B. Baillie's translation from which the quotes below are taken).The 
whole problem is set in the context of mutual recognition because without such 
reciprocal recognition consciousness can not ground itself ontologically.  As Hegel 
puts it: 
 Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that, it exists for another 
self-consciousness that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or recognized …self-consciousness 
has before it another self-consciousness … it must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation… it 
must set itself to sublate the other independent being… secondly, it therefore proceeds to sublate its 
own self. (B-229) 
 One who becomes the master “…is the consciousnesss that exists for itself; but 
no longer merely the general notion of existence for self.” (B-239) In this 
social-spiritual metaphor, the master “… is the power dominating existence.” (B-235) 
However, it is the bondsman who labors and is thus related to the world of things in 
nature. Therefore, Hegel concludes: 
 “The truth of the independent consciousness is … the consciousness of the bondsman …bondage 
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will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness     
within itself. It will enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence.” (B-237) 
 Hegel is quite explicit with regards  to the role that labor plays in this 
transformation. 
“Though work and labour … the consciousness of the bondsman comes to itself…Labor is desire 
restrained and checked…labor shapes and fashions the thing…The consciousness that toils and serves 
accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as its self.” (B-238) 
 One important aspect of Hegel’s illustration here is that the fundamental 
asymmetry of power prevents the above relations from being a fully spiritual one. 
Only the emergence of a shared recognition, albeit through a life and death struggle, 
can lead to a common ideality. This is objectified in the laws and institutions that are 
the products of historic struggles. Indeed this can be called the dialectics of the spirit 
working through history. Hegel refers to the Greek world described in Sophocles’ 
Antigone to illustrate the limits of the ancient world and the possibilities of further 
movements of consciousness and self-consciousness. In the SL and in his lectures on 
philosophy of history Hegel develops these themes further. 
 We have finally arrived at the point in the PS where the unhappy consciousness 
begins to glimpse spiritual consciousness. This more developed form of 
consciousness understands itself not only as historical and social but also as 
ontologically grounded as well because of this historicity and sociality. Thus the 
self-consciousness of 'Being' itself – “substance” or the “absolute” – now is revealed 
abstractly as socio-historical . From this perspective, Hegel's later work from SL 
onwards through his lectures on the philosophy of right and philosophy of history  
are attempts attempt to make this characterization of consciousness more concrete. 
 However, at this point in PS religion – spiritual consciousness posits the divine 
being – infinite reason, logos, etc. – can still remain the object of consciousness. 
There is still alienation. God is conceived as “the deed of an alien satisfaction.” The 
divine power is separated from human power and the human self “does not find it in 
its own action as such.” (PS 477) 
 At the ultimate stage, according to Hegel, contra Kant, this type of religious 
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consciousness develops into absolute knowing. This step comes with the realization 
that the power attributed to an outside God is actually the power of dialectical reason. 
This  is summed up in Begriff or Concept. Begriff is always and everywhere at work 
in both ontological being and human consciousness. Only at this point of development 
into absolute knowing through dialectical reason, does consciousness dissolve qua 
consciousness. It is finally able to transform itself into speculative thought. It is no 
longer just 'consciousness – of” with its object ‘out there.’ It is now universal 
dialectical reason and presages Hegel’s later thought in SL. In this sense, as claimed at 
the beginning of this essay, SL does indeed begin where PS leaves off. Together, the 
two works develop systematically the ontological unfolding of consciousness by using 
dialectical logic in its full rigor and encompassing scope. 
 
Gadamer's own preliminary arguments in Truth and Method and elsewhere depend in 
crucial ways  on some Hegelian categories. I will discuss just two aspects that are 
mentioned in the previous exposition of Hegelian phenomenology and dialectics. 
Gadamer distinguishes between Erfahrung---a Hegelian category of experience in 
PS-- and Erlebnis. The former for Gadamer is "lived", concrete experience. Hence, I 
have translated the Gadamerian Erfahrung as "lived experience". The latter is a frozen, 
abstract and academic description alien to life as well as genuinely moving art and 
literature. Gadamer usually writes of Erfahrung  with tacit approval and of Erlebnis 
with some degree of disapproval. The second important Hegelian concept is dialectics 
itself, particularly the idea of aufhebung. As the extended discussion on aufhebung 
which includes direct textual evidence from SL in this paper has shown, Hegel's 
subtle conception requires both preservation and overcoming through a movement of 
thought. While Gadamer accepts this part of aufhebung, it can be argued that he 
extends it further, in line with twentieth century developments in phenomenology in 
an entirely original direction. In doing so, he is able to offer a much deeper 
phenomenological account of hermeneutics at the same time. Showing the plausibility 
of these claims and drawing out their implications for understanding social 
phenomena is the task of the rest of the paper. 
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3. Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer: A Phenomenological Hermeneutics ? 
Gadamer himself has acknowledged his intellectual debts to Heidegger. Although 
Gadamer wrote that Heidegger was not impressed by his (Gadamer's) habilitation 
research on "Plato's Dialectical Ethics", his own later work can be read as combining 
both a Husserian and Heideggerian concern with the immediacy of the 
"consciousness-of" the world at hand and Greek and Hegelian dialectics. The debt to 
Husserl for both Heidegger and Gadamer is fundamental. Husserl's attempt, following 
Brentano, to characterize intentionality fully by phenomenological reduction, is 
assessed critically by both the thinkers.10 Both introduce a historicity and a critical 
approach to language in order to overcome some Husserlian philosophical traps and 
roadblocks stemming mainly from the methodology of phenomenological reduction. 
Thus both Heidegger and Gadamer show through their works the influence of and an 
aufhebung of Husserlian strategies of thinking. Unfortunately, a full discussion of this 
topic will take us far from the immediate concerns of moving to a characterization of 
Gadamer's dialectical approach to hermeneutics. In what follows, I discuss a 
minimum of Heideggerian influences that is necessary for us to get to this stage of 
Gadamer's thought. 
 
Heidegger was crucial in turning Gadamer's thought about interpretation and 
understanding towards art. Furthermore,Heidegger's influence shows also in Gadamer's 
                                                       
10
 See in particular, Husserl, E. Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: 
Nijhoff [1929], 1969. 
------The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, trans. D. Carr. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press  
[1936/54], 1970. 
------Experience and Judgement, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, London: Routledge [1939], 
1973. 
------Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - Third Book: 
Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, trans. T. E. Klein and W. E. Pohl, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1980. 
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adopting the idea of phronesis .11 For both Heidegger and Gadamer this pivotal concept 
allows them to pinpoint the crucial role of "… our practical ‘being-in-the world’ over 
and against theoretical apprehension". Just as importantly, the practice of phronesis can 
also be seen as  cultivation of insight into our own concrete existential situation. 
 
Thus Gadamer argues that understanding, and interpretation are just such  practically 
oriented cultivation of insight  with its own rationality. Furthermore such a rationality 
can not be reduced to a set of  abstract rules.Therefore, phronesis can be seen as a 
dialogical and dialectical type of understanding  that Gadamer had already found in 
Plato and Hegel. It is now plausible that  such an understanding of Plato and Hegel, 
refined through a phenomenological analysis is essential for the development of 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics which is given ontological content through a 
precise dialectical process.. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that Gadamer's thinking began with and always 
remained in  dialectical tension with post-Socratic Greek thought,particularly that of 
Plato and Aristotle. Remembering this makes plausible what was said before about his 
early engagement with Plato in both his doctoral and habilitation dissertations. This 
was perhaps decisive in giving him a philosophical direction that he was able to 
develop further dialectically and dialogically by engaging with the thought of Hegel, 
Husserl and Heidegger in particular. 
 
 
 
                                                       
11
 'practical wisdom’(can also be translated as wisdom developed through reflection and practice)--- Book VI of 
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethic. 
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Ultimately, in Truth and Method in particular,Gadamer developed his own distinctive 
and thoroughly dialogical and dialectical approach. Given his engagement with the 
Greek thought, Gadamer's own dialogical and dialectical hermeneutic approach is 
grounded in Platonic-Aristotelian  traditions. This is as to be expected. However, 
following Heideggerian thinking as well and overcoming it at the same time, Gadamer's 
hermeneutics rejects decisively subjectivism and relativism and any simple concept of 
the interpretive method. Gadamer conceptualizes understanding as "…the linguistically 
mediated happening of tradition." 
4. Dialectical Phenomenological Hermeneutics: From Dilthey and Heidegger to 
Gadamer 
As is well known, hermeneutics originated in problems of biblical exegesis and was developed as 
a methodological and theoretical framework  for exegetical purposes particularly by scholars 
such as Chladenius and Meier, Ast and Schleiermacher. In their hands, hermeneutics further 
developed into an overarching theory of textual interpretation in general. This meant--- among 
other things--- developing  a set of universal rules for producing valid interpretations. 
 
Wilhelm Dilthey broadened the scope of hermeneutics still further. In his hands, 
hermeneutics became the methodology for producing meaning that is essential to 
understanding within the ‘human’ or ‘historical’ sciences. In this view, the basic 
problem of hermeneutics was how to provide a methodological and ontological 
foundation for the human sciences. Dilthey and his followers also claimed that the 
mathematical models and procedures from the natural sciences  could not be used in 
the human sciences. Therefore, one must find an alternative methodology proper to 
the human sciences as such. A similar desideratum was developed for the 
interpretation of religious texts earlier. For example, Schleiermacher's ambition was to 
develop a formal methodology for the strict  codification of interpretive practice. 
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Dilthey himself attempted to develop principles for properly arriving at interpretive 
understanding or Verstehen.  
Heidegger's hermeneutics is conceived as that type of an interpretative approach which 
makes possible the investigation of the basic structures of facticity of our existence. 
Such hermeneutics  can produce a  "self-disclosure" of the structure of understanding 
as such. Thus, 
The ‘hermeneutic circle’ that had been a central idea in previous hermeneutic thinking, and that had been 
viewed in terms of the interpretative interdependence, within any meaningful structure, between the parts 
of that structure and the whole, was transformed by Heidegger, so that it was now seen as expressing the 
way in which all understanding was ‘always already’ given over to that which is to be understood (to ‘the 
things themselves' -- 'die Sachen selbst’). Thus, to take a simple example, if we wish to understand some 
particular artwork, we already need to have some prior understanding of that work (even if only as a set 
of paintmarks on canvas), otherwise it cannot even be seen as something to be understood. To put the 
point more generally, and in more basic ontological terms, if we are to understand anything at all, we 
must already find ourselves ‘in’ the world ‘along with’ that which is to be understood. All understanding 
that is directed at the grasp of some particular subject matter is thus based in a prior ‘ontological’ 
understanding -- a prior hermeneutical situatedness. On this basis, hermeneutics can be understood as the 
attempt to ‘make explicit’ the structure of such situatedness. Yet since that situatedness is indeed prior to 
any specific event of understanding, so it must always be presupposed even in the attempt at its own 
explication. Consequently, the explication of this situatedness -- of this basic ontological mode of 
understanding -- is essentially a matter of exhibiting or ‘laying-bare’ a structure with which we are 
already familiar (the structure that is present in every event of understanding), and, in this respect, 
hermeneutics becomes one with phenomenology, itself understood, in Heidegger's thinking, as just such 
a ‘laying bare’. 
Hermeneutics--- in the above Heideggerian and phenomenological sense--- is further 
dialectically transformed by Gadamer's work.Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics 
encompasses the ontologically fundamental character of the hermeneutical situation 
and the omnipresence of hermeneutic practice. This can be seen as both a radical break 
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and reworking--as aufhebung. In this context, as Truth and Method makes clear, artistic 
interpretation and understanding can become the very model of truth in dialogue and 
disclosure.12 
 
In keeping with the Heideggerian approach, for Gadamer, understanding always 
occurs against the background of our prior involvement or--- to put it in another 
way--- our history. Therefore, understanding, for Gadamer, is "… an ‘effect’ of history, 
while hermeneutical ‘consciousness' is itself that mode of being that is conscious of 
its own historical ‘being effected’. Thus the hermeneutically inclined consciousness is 
an "effectively historicized consciousness" (Wirkungsgeschictliche Bewußtsein). The 
consciousness of the historicized character of understanding is, according to Gadamer, 
the awareness of the hermeneutical situation and is the Husserlian phenomenological 
concept of ‘horizon’ (’Horizont’). That is to say, understanding and interpretation 
must inevitably occur within the shifting limits of a particular ‘horizon’ of our 
situatedness in actual history.  
 A consequence of the above Wirkungsgeschictliche Bewußtsein is that  our historical 
and hermeneutic situation are never totally transparent. Here  Gadamer explicitly 
overcomes the Hegelian ‘philosophy of reflection’. It may be recalled that in the 
Hegelian Logic such reflection is supposed to achieve both completion and 
transparency. 
                                                       
12
 There are other---perhaps lesspositive--- features of Gadamer's hermeneutics that can not be addressed here. 
The role of "prejudice" is a good example. 
"The prejudicial character of understanding means that, whenever we understand, we are involved in a dialogue 
that encompasses both our own self-understanding and our understanding of the matter at issue. In the dialogue of 
understanding our prejudices come to the fore, both inasmuch as they play a crucial role in opening up what is to 
be understood, and inasmuch as they themselves become evident in that process. As our prejudices thereby become 
apparent to us, so they can also become the focus of questioning in their own turn. While Gadamer has claimed 
that ‘temporal distance’ can play a useful role in enabling us better to identify those prejudices that exercise a 
problematic influence on understanding (Gadamer acknowledges that prejudices can sometimes distort -- the point 
is that they do not always do so), it seems better to see the dialogical interplay that occurs in the process of 
understanding itself as the means by which such problematic elements are identified and worked through. One 
consequence of Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice is a positive evaluation of the role of authority and tradition 
as legitimate sources of knowledge, and this has often been seen, most famously by Jürgen Habermas, as indicative 
of Gadamer's ideological conservatism." 
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Incomplete as Wirkungsgeschictliches Bewußtsein is by necessity, this need not lead 
one to a subjectivist stance.For Gadamer, in contrast with the traditional hermeneutic 
account,understanding is not achieved through gaining access to some inner realm of 
subjective meaning. At the same time,there is no final determinacy to understanding. 
Therefore, Gadamer argues that there is no closed system or method for achieving 
understanding or arriving at truth. All such search for encompassing methods are thus 
fundamentally misguided.13 
  
At the end of Truth and Method the basic paradigm for discovering "truth" is that  of 
conversation. This means giving up control and playing a game(spiel) in which much 
is left to indeterminacy. Now, it is obvious for Gadamer that conversation always 
takes place in language and therefore, understanding is always linguistically mediated. 
If this is true then all understanding must already be based on a common language 
that is itself formed in the process of conversation leading to understanding .In this 
sense, like Wittgenstein, Gadamer rejects the idea of  a ‘private language’. Our 
conversations through  language always engage others-in-the-world. Going back to 
the emphasis on Erfahrung, we can now say that this lived experience is 
experience-with-others that constitutes for Gadamer an event(Geschehen) of meaning. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions---Meaning and the Moral Sciences 
                                                       
13It is important to recognize that "…not only is there no methodology that describes the means by 
which to arrive at an understanding of the human or the historical, but neither is there any such 
methodology that is adequate to the understanding of the non-human or the natural. Gadamer's 
conception of understanding as not reducible to method or technique, along with his insistence of 
understanding as an ongoing process that has no final completion, not only invites comparison with ideas 
to be found in the work of the later Wittgenstein, but when applied to the philosophy of science, can also 
be seen as paralleling the work of T. S. Kuhn and others." 
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Gadamer himself draws attention to the irony involved in the untranslatibility into 
English of the German term Geisteswissenschaften which itself was once the result of 
the attempt to translate Mill's term "the moral sciences" into German. What we have 
seen in this brief discussion of a few aspects of Gadamer's thought and its relations 
with Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger is the irreducible and ineluctable modality of 
existence with at least a partial indeterminacy of interpretation. However, the other 
part of the message is at least the partial possibility of interpretation, albeit against a 
dynamic and evershifting but firm presence of the Husserlian horizon of meaning. 
The dialectics of play ( spiel) presents the possibility of such fresh non-subjective 
interpretations. 
 
At the end we must raise the question of how much damage the phenomenological 
Gadamerian hermeneutics does to the traditional conception of scientific method and 
what Gadamer's approach can contribute to our further understanding of the human 
sciences.Clearly, the line of thinking  that Gadamer develops in Truth and Method 
has serious consequences for the human sciences. A positivist science limited to sense 
data and a Humean conception of meaning is superficial at best.. However, is a realist, 
causal philosophy of science any better? From the above analysis and discussion it 
would seem that grand claims about realism must be given up. However, a more 
modest, topic-specific dialectical and dialogical realism is possible(Miller 1987, 
Khan(2008a,b,c). A deeper understanding of both realism and Gadamer can allow us 
to see the phenomenological hermeneutics and this type of scientific realism as 
complementary modes of inquiry. One must then engage in a lively dialogical play in 
order to let "truth" emerge in a way that I have called Gadamer's dialectics of play 
( Spiel) in contradistinction with the Hegelian dialectics.  
 
 
 
Therefore, while it is clear that the dialogical dialectics of Gadamer produces its own 
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non-subjective truth of disclosure through conversation, it does not necessarily point 
towards a rejection of science. What it does reject is a dogmatic codification of the 
scientific method. Science itself is interpretation. Like Hegel before him, but in a 
more nuanced and dialogical manner, Gadamer emphasizes the need for a 
non-subjectivist but fallible overcoming of past categories and interpretations. 
Although Gadamer's own cultural commitments were somewhat conservative, his 
approach leaves a great deal of room for a radically humanistic social science of 
changing ourselves and our view of the world through dialogue. This is a profoundly 
moral consequence of Gadamer's thought for the "moral (social ) sciences". 
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